We document the triangular relationship formed by the strength of the US dollar, cross-border bank lending in dollars and deviations from covered interest parity (CIP). A stronger dollar goes hand-in-hand with bigger deviations from CIP and contractions of cross-border bank lending in dollars. Differential sensitivity of CIP deviations to the strength of the dollar can explain cross-sectional variations in CIP arbitrage profits. We argue that underpinning the triangle is the role of the dollar as proxy for the shadow price of bank leverage. for very helpful comments. We also thank Bat-el Berger for excellent research support.
Introduction
One of the most significant developments in global financial markets in recent years has been the breakdown of covered interest parity (CIP). CIP is perhaps the best-established principle in international finance, and states that the interest rates implicit in foreign exchange swap markets coincide with the corresponding interest rates in cash markets.
Otherwise, someone could make a riskless profit by borrowing at the low interest rate and lending at the higher interest rate with currency risk fully hedged. However, the principle broke down during the height of the 2008-2009 crisis. After the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), CIP deviations have persisted and have become more significant recently, especially since mid-2014.
Why do such apparent risk-free arbitrage opportunities exist? In competitive markets, market participants are price takers, and can take on any quantity of goods at the prevailing market price. The textbook arbitrage argument is that someone could borrow at the low interest rate and lend out at the higher interest rate, having hedged currency risk completely. The failure of CIP would thereby open up the possibility of unlimited riskless profits. However, in textbooks, there are no banks. In practice, though, such arbitrage typically entails borrowing and lending through banks, and the competitive assumption is violated due to balance sheet constraints that place limits on the size of the exposures that can be taken on by banks. Even for non-banks, their ability to exploit arbitrage opportunities rely on banks to provide leverage. Hence, if deviations from CIP persist, it must be because banks do not or cannot exploit such opportunities.
Our focus, therefore, is on the banking sector, and the ability of banks to take on leverage. The key message of our paper is that the value of the dollar plays the role of a barometer of risk-taking capacity in capital markets. In particular, it is the spot exchange rate of the dollar which plays a crucial role. Deviations from CIP turn on the strength of the dollar; when the dollar strengthens, the deviation from CIP becomes larger. To the extent that CIP deviations turn on the constraints on bank leverage, our results suggest that the strength of the dollar is a key determinant of bank leverage.
The cross-currency basis is the difference between the dollar interest rate in the cash Cross-currency basis of euro against the dollar market and the implied dollar interest rate from the swap market when swapping foreign currency into dollars. The cross-currency basis measures deviations from the CIP condition. Figure 1 plots the broad dollar index (in red), which is the trade-weighted US dollar exchange rate against its major trading partners. When the red line goes up, the dollar strengthens. The blue line tracks the average cross-currency basis for the ten most liquid currencies vis-à-vis the dollar. We see that the cross-currency basis is the mirror image of dollar strength. When the dollar strengthens, the CIP deviations widen. This is especially so in the last 24 months, reflecting the stronger dollar.
As we demonstrate in the paper, there is also an asset-pricing relationship underpinning these empirical observations. The exposure to the dollar exchange rate is priced in the cross-section of CIP deviations in the sense that variations in CIP deviations across currencies are explained by the sensitivity of the deviations to fluctuations in the broad dollar index. The CIP deviations of different currencies have differing exposures to the dollar factor. Interestingly, we document a reversal of roles. The classical "safe haven" currencies, such as the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc, have the highest exposure to the dollar factor, and high-yielding "carry" currencies, such as the Australian dollar and the New Zealand dollar, have the lowest exposure to the dollar factor. Currencies with higher exposure to the dollar factor exhibit larger CIP deviations and thereby offer greater potential arbitrage profits for banks. Furthermore, the relationship between the level of the basis and the sensitivity to the dollar factor is strongly supported by the event study based on the strong dollar depreciation following the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
One possible explanation for our results is related to the financial channel of exchange rates, through which fluctuations in the strength of the dollar set in motion changes in capital market intermediation spreads that respond at a high frequency. The net exports channel of exchange rate changes is standard in open economy macro models, but the financial channel is less standard, and may operate in the opposite direction to the net exports channel. Under the net exports channel, it is when the domestic currency depreciates that real economic activity picks up. By contrast, the financial channel appears to operate in the opposite direction; it is when the domestic currency appreciates, financial conditions in that country loosen, and CIP deviations narrow.
Why do the CIP deviations narrow when the domestic currency strengthens against the dollar? We argue that underpinning this relationship is the role of bank leverage and cross-border bank lending in dollars. Indeed, we will show the existence of a "triangle" that coherently ties together (i) the value of the dollar; (ii) the cross-currency basis; and (iii) cross-border bank lending. In this triangle, a depreciation of the dollar is associated with greater borrowing in dollars by non-residents.
The relationship between cross-border dollar lending and the dollar is illustrated in Figure 2 . The left-hand panel plots the quarterly growth rate of global dollar-denominated cross-border bank lending flows against the broad dollar index. It reveals that there is a negative relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, the relationship is strongly statistically significant. As we demonstrate in the empirical section of this paper, the statistical significance of the above relationship is robust to controlling for a number of additional factors.
The right-hand panel of Figure 3 examines how the above relationship has evolved over time. More concretely, it displays the coefficients obtained from rolling window regressions of the quarterly growth rate of dollar-denominated cross-border bank lending on changes in the value of the dollar. It appears that, while the negative relationship between the above two variables has been strong throughout the sample period, it gradually Complete sample 1 strengthened over the decade leading up to the GFC and reached a peak in 2008 during the acute phase of the crisis.
Cross-currency basis, US dollar index and cross-border lending
In addition, we show that similar relationship between the exchange rate, the crosscurrency basis and cross-border bank lending can also be found for the euro in the postcrisis sample. This is the case despite the fact that the triangular relationship is absent for other major currencies, which points to the unique role of international funding currencies in affecting leverage and risk-taking via fluctuations in exchange rate valuations.
This empirical regularity has several potential drivers, both on the demand for dollar credit on the part of borrowers as well as on the supply of dollar credit by lenders. The negative relationship between dollar credit, a proxy for bank leverage, and the magnitude of CIP deviations, the price of balance sheet capacity, point in favor of supply drivers.
The mechanism whereby a dollar depreciation leads to an increase in the supply of dollar credit has been dubbed the "risk-taking channel" by Bruno and Shin (2015a, b) . When there is potential for valuation mismatches on borrowers' balance sheets arising from exchange rate changes, a weaker dollar flatters the balance sheet of dollar borrowers, whose liabilities fall relative to assets. From the standpoint of creditors, the stronger credit position of borrowers reduces tail risks in the credit portfolio and creates spare capacity for additional credit extension even with a fixed exposure limit through a valueat-risk (VaR) constraint or economic capital constraint. We sketch on a simple model in this setting to illustrate that a stronger dollar increases the shadow cost of bank balance sheet capacity, and therefore reduces the supply of dollar credit and increases CIP deviations.
Finally, we provide some direct empirical evidence using equity prices of internationally active banks to show that a stronger dollar negatively affects bank equities, which translates into lower bank balance sheet capacity. In particular, we show that bank equities in currency areas with more negative basis (indicating a dollar funding shortage) are more adversely affected by a broad dollar appreciation. 
An overview of the issues
We define the n-year cross-currency basis of currency i vis-à-vis the US dollar, denoted
x it,t+n , as the deviation from the CIP condition between currency i and the dollar :
where y $ t,t+n is the n-year dollar interest rate, y i t,t+n is the n-year interest rate in currency i, S it is the dollar spot exchange rate of currency i and F it,t+n is the outright forward rate for currency i. Both forward and spot exchange rates are defined in terms of currency units i per dollar. Equivalently, in logs, the currency basis is equal to:
where ρ it,t+n ≡ 1 n [log(F it,t+n ) − log(S it,t+n )] is the market-implied forward premium to hedge foreign currency i against the US dollar.
The cross-currency basis measures the difference between the direct dollar interest rate in the cash market, y $ t,t+n , and the implied dollar interest rate in the swap market, terly flows that take exchange rate fluctuations into account. In addition, the estimated quarterly flows are statistically adjusted for breaks in series. Furthermore, the LBS feature breakdowns by borrowing counterparty sector and country. In the context of our empirical exercises, these additional breakdowns allow us to distinguish among borrowers from different sectors and countries. Changes in the broad dollar index are -75% correlated with changes in the first principal component of the cross-currency basis, and -56% correlated with the growth rates of dollar-denominated cross-border lending. Therefore, a stronger dollar is associated with greater CIP deviations (or a higher price for balance sheet capacity) and with lower growth rates in dollar-denominated cross-border bank lending.
The dollar and the cross-currency basis
In this section, we examine the empirical relationship between the dollar spot exchange rate and the cross-currency basis. After presenting some summary statistics of CIP deviations, we first show the strong contemporaneous relationship between the dollar exchange rate and CIP deviations. Next, we present evidence that the dollar exchange rate acts as a risk factor in pricing the cross-section of CIP deviations. Finally, we show that the spot-basis relationship is absent for using other currencies, except the euro, as the base currency.
Summary Statistics of the cross-currency basis
Our empirical analysis is based on its position vis-a-vis the ten most liquid currencies in the world (other than the dollar itself). We consider all currencies with a total daily turnover exceeding $2 trillion as of April 2013. In particular, the currencies we focus on are the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Swiss franc, the Danish krone, the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, the Norwegian krone, the New Zealand dollar, and the Swedish krona (Bank of International Settlements (2013)). All raw data are obtained from Bloomberg and our sample period ranges from 1 January 2007 to 2 February 2016. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the three-month and five-year crosscurrency basis for our sample of 10 currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar. The cross-currency basis here is defined as the difference between the US Libor and the implied dollar interest rate by swapping foreign currency into dollars. On average, the cross-currency basis is negative in our sample, which suggests that the dollar interest rate in the cash market is lower than the implied dollar interest rate in the swap market, and banks can borrow dollars in the cash market and lend dollars in the swap market to make arbitrage profits.
The average three-month basis is positive for the Australian and the New Zealand dollar, but negative for all other currencies, ranging from -11 to -62 basis points. The average
five-year basis is positive for the Australian, the New Zealand, and the Canadian dollar, and negative for all other currencies. 
The dollar spot rate and the cross-currency basis
We now examine the relationship between the dollar spot exchange rate and the crosscurrency basis. In our baseline specification, we regress changes in the cross-currency basis on contemporaneous changes in the aggregate dollar index and on changes in the bilateral dollar exchange rates. 3 To check the robustness of our results, we control for other potential drivers. Our benchmark regression specification is given by:
Let α i be a currency fixed effect and ∆x it stand for changes in the cross-currency basis of currency i vis-à-vis the US dollar between t and t − 1. The variable ∆Dollar t denotes changes in the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) US trade-weighted broad dollar index and ∆BER it indicates changes in the bilateral exchange rate for currency i vis-à-vis the dollar.
Positive values of ∆Dollar t and ∆BER it , respectively, both denote a dollar appreciation.
Finally, CONTR it is a vector of control variables.
In terms of the vector of controls, first, we follow Bruno 
, and we add changes in the foreign and US Treasury (10-year over two-year) term spread differential, ∆(ts it − ts U S t ). These controls are in part driven by divergent monetary policy stances between foreign countries and the US. Table 2 shows our regression results for the daily changes in the three-month crosscurrency basis. The coefficient estimate on ∆Dollar t is negative and significant across all specifications, suggesting that a dollar appreciation is associated with a more negative cross-currency basis, and, hence, greater CIP deviations. In terms of the magnitude, the coefficient estimate on ∆Dollar t in Column 1 (excluding additional control variables)
Daily Regressions
implies that a one percentage point appreciation of the US dollar is associated with a 2.6 basis point decrease in the cross-currency basis, which corresponds to a 2.6 widening of CIP deviations. After including all controls, a one percentage point appreciation of the dollar is associated with a 2.1 basis point decrease in the cross-currency basis in Column 6. Given that the standard deviation for daily changes in the cross-currency basis is about 7 basis points, the impact of the broad dollar index on the basis is not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. These results are especially remarkable, because they draw on daily changes in the cross-currency basis and spot exchange rates, which are notoriously noisy. Notes: This table shows regression In terms of control variables, neither the level nor changes in the VIX do enter significantly once ∆Dollar t is part of our regression specification. Changes in the implied volatility of currency options are negatively correlated with changes in the cross-currency basis. This is intuitive in the context of our model, as higher currency volatility makes the VaR constraint more binding and thus reduces the risk-bearing capacity of the financial intermediary. In addition, changes in FX option risk reversal are also negatively correlated with changes in the cross-currency basis, suggesting that an increase in the skewness of the distribution towards a foreign currency depreciation (or dollar appreciation) also contributes to higher CIP deviations. Finally, the (foreign over US Treasury) yield differential enters with a significantly positive sign, which is consistent findings of Du, Tepper and Verdelhan (Forthcoming) in that the nominal interest rate differential acts as a driver of the basis. However, the difference in the slope of the government bond yield curves between foreign countries and the US enters with the opposite sign when compared with the coefficient on the interest rate margin in Iida, Kimura and Sudo (2016).
Quarterly Regressions
The significantly negative correlation between changes in the cross-currency basis and the strength of the dollar is not restricted to short-dated contracts at the daily frequency.
We obtain similar results for the longer-term cross-currency basis at the quarterly frequency. Table 3 presents In unreported regressions, we find that these results are not driven by the GFC. We repeat all daily and quarterly regression specifications for the subsample starting in January 2009 and obtain negative coefficient estimates on ∆Dollar t of similar magnitude at even higher levels of statistical significance. In sum, we find that when the dollar appreciates, the cross-currency basis becomes more negative, which entails larger arbitrage opportunities of borrowing dollars in the cash market and lending dollars via the FX swap market. Notes: This table shows regression 
Cross-country relationship between the dollar and the basis
In addition to the strong contemporaneous correlation between changes in the crosscurrency basis and changes in the broad dollar index, we also find that differential loadings on the dollar index help to explain the magnitude of the basis in the cross section. Our results suggest that the strength of the dollar likely acts as a risk factor in the global investor's pricing kernel.
Benchmark estimation
We first estimate the currency-specific loadings on the broad dollar index, β i , from the following regression:
We obtain the dollar beta using both daily regressions for the three-month basis and quarterly regressions for the five-year basis. The dollar betas for individual currencies are presented in Table 4 . We can see that the dollar beta is significantly negative for most currencies. The exceptions are the Australian dollar at the three-month horizon, and the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar and the New Zealand dollar at the five-year horizon.
To see whether the Broad dollar acts as a risk factor, we regress the mean of the cross-currency basis on the dollar beta as follows,
where bs i is the mean cross-currency basis for currency i. If the dollar is a priced risk factor, we should expect λ 1 > 0. To see this, we note that an arbitrageur's expected return on the CIP trade, which consists of borrowing the dollar and investing in the foreign currency, is equal to the negative of the basis. However, the return on the strategy is certain only if the arbitrageur holds the trade until maturity. During the life of the trade, the arbitrage strategy is subject to mark-to-market risks, which are in turn correlated with the strength of the dollar to different extent. If the dollar is a global risk factor in the arbitrageur's pricing kernel, higher systematic loadings on the dollar factor (a more negative dollar beta) require higher expected returns, or a more negative cross-currency basis. Therefore, we should expect a positive relationship between the level of the crosscurrency basis and the dollar beta.
To visualize the cross-sectional relationship, Figure 4 plots the average basis against Impulse response functions of US dollar denominated cross-border bank lending to a US dollar exchange rate shock the corresponding dollar beta. We can see a strong positive relationship between the average basis and the dollar beta with a bivariate correlation equal to 85% for the threemonth basis and 97% for the five-year basis. Table (5) reports the regression coefficients for the relationship. As increase in the magnitude of the dollar beta by 1 corresponds to an increase in the expected returns of 11 basis points based on three-month CIP deviations and 26 basis points based on five-year CIP deviations.
Taking together, these findings suggest that the aggregate dollar exchange rate acts as a risk factor that is priced in the cross section of CIP arbitrage returns. The crosscurrency basis with more systematic exposure to the dollar tends to have higher expected returns for the CIP trade. 
(8) Notes: This table reports the regression coefficients of the mean cross-currency basis in basis points on the dollar beta across countries. Column 1 reports results based on the three-month basis and Column 2 reports results based on the five-year basis. Bootstrapped standard errors for the two-pass regressions based on 10,000 replications are shown in the parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Event Study following the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Our main sample ended before the U.S. presidential election on November 8, 2016. The appreciation of the dollar after the election presents an opportunity to put the main predictions to an out-of-sample test. As shown in Table 6 , the broad dollar index of 1 showed the existence of a "triangular relationship" between a stronger dollar, slower cross-border bank capital flows in dollars and wider deviations from covered interest parity. The sample in Avdjiev et al ended before the US presidential election on November 8. The recent appreciation of the dollar presents an opportunity to put the main predictions to an out-of-sample test. This addendum reports the findings.
The evidence from the post-election sample confirms the original findings in Avdjiev, Du, Koch and Shin (2016). As shown in Table 1 , the broad dollar index of the Federal Reserve rose by 3.9% between 8 November and 29 November. During the same period, the crosscurrency basis widened for all G10 currencies. The largest movement was for the yen, with the basis widening from -70.3 basis points to -90.5 basis points.
For the post-election period, the "dollar beta" is defined as the ratio of the change in the cross-currency basis (in basis points) over changes in the broad dollar index (in percentage points). In line with the findings in Avdjiev, Du, Koch and Shin (2016), the dollar beta is highly correlated with the basis itself. The correlation coefficient is 98%. 
The dollar and cross-currency basis since the US election

The spot-basis relationship using other base currencies
So far, the cross-currency basis has been defined with respect to the US dollar as the base currency. In this section, we examine whether the negative relationship between the cross-currency basis and the aggregate exchange rate index also applies to a set of other base currencies. We find a similar negative and significant relationship for the euro in the post-crisis period at both daily and quarterly frequencies. However, our findings do not support such a significant relationship for other currencies as the base currency, except for the Danish krone (which is pegged to the euro) and the Swedish krona at a daily frequency. These results show that there is no mechanical spot-basis relationship with respect to any arbitrary base currency. The strong, negative relationships for the US dollar and the euro (during the post-crisis period) point to their unique role as major international funding currencies.
In terms of our empirical analysis, Equation 6 redefines the basis of currency i with respect to a new base currency j :
where ∆x (j) it = x it − x jt denotes changes in the cross-currency basis of currency i with respect to base currency j. We obtain ∆x 
Panel regressions
In our benchmark panel regression specification, we regress the quarterly growth rate of dollar denominated cross-border bank lending to a given counterparty country on quarterly changes in the broad dollar index and on the bilateral exchange rate of the dollar vis-à-vis the local currency of the respective borrowing country. We control for heterogeneity on the demand side of cross-border credit by including borrowing-country fixed effects. Our benchmark specification is given by:
where ∆xbl it is the quarterly growth rate of dollar-denominated cross-border bank lending to borrowers in country i between t and t − 1. Let α i be a borrowing-country fixed effect.
As before, the variable ∆Dollar t denotes changes in the broad dollar index, and variable ∆BER it indicates changes in the bilateral exchange rate for currency i vis-à-vis the dollar.
Positive ∆Dollar t and ∆BER it imply a dollar appreciation. the dollar index is negative and statistically significant (Column 1). The same is true for the coefficient on the bilateral dollar exchange rate (Column 2). Moreover, both of the above variables remain negative and strongly statistically significant even when jointly entering the regression (Column 3). Our results therefore show that the dollar index has explanatory power over and above the bilateral dollar exchange rate for cross-border bank lending. This finding strongly supports our previous hypothesis that the dollar is a global risk factor, which affects the risk-taking capacity of banks, and, ultimately, the supply of cross-border bank lending. The above results hold not only for lending to all sectors but also for distinct subsamples of bank (Columns 4-6) and non-bank lending (Columns 7-9).
The magnitude of the estimated impacts is considerable. The highly significant coefficient on the US dollar index is -0.49, which implies that a one percentage point (aggregate) appreciation of the dollar is associated with a 49 basis point decline in the growth rate dollar-denominated cross-border bank lending. The estimated coefficient for lending to banks is even larger in absolute value (-0.61), implying that the decline is even stronger for interbank lending. This finding is in line with the prediction of the "double-decker" model of international banking proposed by Bruno and Shin (2015b). 
Structural Panel Vector Autoregressions (SPVARs)
In order to explore the dynamic interdependencies between the main variables of interest, while taking full advantage of the cross-sectional richness of the data, we estimate structural panel VARs. More concretely, we consider the following structural panel VAR:
where y it is an m-dimensional vector of our stacked endogenous variables, f i is a diagonal matrix of country-specific intercepts, A(L) = p j=0 A j L j is a polynomial of lagged coefficients A j is a matrix of lagged coefficients, L j is the lag operator, B is a matrix of contemporaneous coefficients, and u it is a vector of stacked structural innovations with a diagonal covariance matrix described by u t ∼ N (0, 1 m ) and E(u t u s ) = 0 m all s = t.
In our baseline specification, we set:
where ∆ir t is the quarterly change in the US dollar policy rate, ∆xbl it is the quarterly growth rate in dollar-denominated lending (in percent), ln V IX t is the log of the VIX index, 4 and ∆BER it denotes the percent change in the bilateral exchange rate of the local currency vis-à-vis the dollar.
We follow the variable ordering used in Bruno and Shin (2015a) . Most importantly, in all panel structural VAR specifications that we explore, the cross-border lending variable is ordered ahead of the FX variable. This rules out any contemporaneous effects of the FX rate on cross-border lending, thus tilting the odds against the finding of results predicted by the theoretical model of Bruno and Shin (2015b) . Figure 5 displays the impulse responses from our benchmark (four variable) specification. They reveal that the bilateral exchange rate has a negative and strongly statistically significant impact on cross-border bank lending. This is the case for lending to borrowers from all sectors, as well as for our distinct subsamples of lending to bank and non-bank turns out that the relationship between these two variables is negative and statistically significant.
The right-hand panel of Figure 6 displays the coefficients obtained from rolling window regressions of the quarterly growth rate of cross-border bank lending denominated in euros on the change in the exchange rate value of the euro. During the pre-crisis (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) period, the impact of fluctuations in the euro exchange rate on cross-border bank lending denominated in euros was not statistically significant (and, at times, was even positive).
Nevertheless, the post-crisis period has seen a sustained dive of the estimated impact coefficients into negative territory.
In summary, in the post-crisis sample, we find a triangular relationship for the euro that is similar to the one that exists for the US dollar. More concretely, a stronger euro is associated with wider CIP deviations vis-à-vis the euro and contractions in cross-border bank lending denominated in euros. This points to a more prominent role of the euro as a global funding currency in recent years. The bank is risk neutral and is a price taker in the dollar loan market as well as in the FX swap market. The risk neutral bank maximises profits subject to VaR constraint, to be described below.
We adopt the following notation. Denote by a 1 the dollar amount lent to emerging market corporates and denote by a 2 the dollar face value of FX swap claims. The bank does not hold any other asset. The balance sheet identity of the bank is:
where e is the bank's book equity in dollar terms and d is the dollar value of debt financing.
Assume for simplicity that the dollar funding d can be raised at the riskless dollar rate and that the riskless dollar rate is zero. The profit r of the bank is then given by:
where r 1 is the gross return on dollar loans to corporates and r 2 is the gross return to the bank in the FX swap.
The bank maximises expected profits subject to a VaR constraint. The bank's optimisation problem can be written as:
where E (r) is the expected profit of the bank. We limit attention to the choice of a 1 and a 2 only, as the bank's debt funding d follows from the balance sheet identity (10) .
Assume that the VaR is a multiple α of the standard devation of portfolio return σ r so that VaR = ασ r . The constraint is:
We transform the constraint by squaring both sides and dividing by α 2 to give:
Then, write the Lagrangean as:
where E (r) is the expected return of the bank's asset portfolio, λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the VaR constraint and σ 2 r is the variance of the bank's profit.
The third term in the Lagrangean L in (13) does not depend on a 1 or a 2 , and so will drop out when the first-order condition is taken. The first two terms of the Lagrangean is a quadratic expression. We use the shorthand:
and denote the covariance matrix of returns as:
We can interpret µ 2 − 1 as the size of the CIP deviation in the absolute value (or the negative of the cross-currency basis). It is the expected payoff from lending dollars in the FX swap market. The investor faces mark-to-market risk, and so there is some risk in the trade.
The first two terms of the Lagrangean can be written as the quadratic form:
The first-order condition is:
Solving for a 1 and a 2 , the optimal portfolio is:
Meanwhile, the variance of profit is given by the quadratic form:
where a is the transpose of a. From (14) we have
Finally, from the VaR constraint, we have σ 2 r = e α 2 . Thus,
The Lagrange multiplier of the transformed constraint is:
The expression µ Σ −1 µ is the analogue of the Sharpe ratio µ/σ, generalised to the context of two risky assets. The Lagrange multiplier is the shadow value of balance sheet capacity for the bank.
Substituting (15) into the first-order condition (14) allows us to solve for the optimal portfolio of the bank:
The optimal portfolio in (16) is proportional to equity e. When the equity of the investor doubles, the size of its positions also doubles. In this sense, the portfolio holdings of the risky assets satisfy a "constant returns to scale" property. Two implications flow from this property. The first is that when the bank suffers losses, it scales back its portfolio in proportion to the erosion of its equity. Second, our model has an aggregation property for the banking sector as a whole in which the aggregate lending and outstanding amounts of the FX swap have the same expression as in (16) , but in which we have equity for the banking sector as a whole.
Specifically, if e k is the equity of bank k, let:
be the aggregate equity of the banking sector as a whole, where B is the set of banks.
Denote by A 1 and A 2 the aggregate values of a 1 and a 2 across the banking sector. Then, from (16) , the assets of the banking sector as a whole are given by:
It remains to solve for µ 1 and µ 2 from the market-clearing condition. Denote by X 1 (µ 1 ) the demand for dollar loans by EME corporates, which is a decreasing function of µ 1 . Denote by X 2 (µ 2 ) the demand for dollars in the FX swap market, decreasing in µ 2 .
Recall that we interpret µ 2 −1 as the (negative of the) cross-currency basis. The downward sloping demand for loans and dollar funding via the FX swap market is consistent with models with preferred habitat, as in Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) . From (18) , the market clearing condition can be written:
We now consider the comparative statics of an appreciation of the US dollar. The appreciating dollar entails losses for the corporate borrowers who have borrowed dollars to finance local currency assets. As a consequence, the aggregate value of banks' loans also suffer some losses, resulting in a lower level of the aggregate equity of the banking sector, from E to E where E < E. To restore market clearing, both µ 1 and µ 2 increase.
For us, it is the increase in µ 2 which is of interest, as it represents a widening of the cross-currency basis. We thus have:
Proposition. An appreciation of the dollar entails a widening of the cross-currency basis and a contraction of bank lending in dollars.
In terms of our expression for the Lagrange multiplier of the VaR constraint (15) , the shadow value of bank balance sheet capacity increases for two reasons. The first is that the price of credit increases and raises µ. Second, the erosion of equity means that the denominator declines. The cross-currency basis fluctuates with the shadow value of balance sheet capacity, and the fluctuation is higher for banks that are more leveraged.
Bank Equities and the Broad Dollar
Finally, consistent with the model outlined in the previous section, we provide empirical support that a strong dollar has a negative impact on bank equities, particularly in currency areas with more negative cross-currency basis. We focus on a sample of 51 internationally active banks in G10 currency areas. The list of banks is provided in Appendix A. We perform panel regressions with bank fixed effects of bank equity returns in local currency on broad dollar movements at the quarterly frequency. In Column 1 of Table 9 , we show that a 1% appreciation of the broad dollar index is associated with a 2% decline in bank equities. Once we control for the market returns in Column 2, the change in the broad dollar remains significant: a 1% appreciation of the broad is still associated with 0.27% decline in bank equities.
In Column 3, we examine differential sensitivity of bank equities with respect to the dollar movements by including an interaction between movements in the broad dollar index and the 5-year cross-currency basis. The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive, which indicates that bank equities in countries with a more negative cross-currency basis respond more negatively to a dollar appreciation. The coefficient on the change in the broad dollar is very small and no longer significant once the interaction term is added. This suggests that for countries with the cross-currency basis equal to zero (e.g. the United States), bank equities are not significantly correlated with movements in the dollar after controlling for the market returns. For countries with a positive basis, such as the Australia, bank equities actually respond positively to a dollar appreciation after controlling for benchmark equity index returns. Notes: In all three columns, the dependent variable is the quarterly equity return in local currency. The independent variables are ∆Broad t , quarterly change in the broad dollar index (∆Broad t > 0 indicates broad appreciation), ∆Broad t × bs t , the interaction between the broad dollar movement and the 5-year cross-currency basis, and ∆M arket t , quarterly benchmark equity index return. All regressions include bank fixed effects and use robust standard errors clustered by banks, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.5 and *p < 0.1. Notes: On the x-axis, we plot the mean 5-year cross-currency basis by currency. On the y-axis, we plot the average ratio of the regression beta of changes in the bank equities on changes in the broad dollar index over the regression beta of changes in the benchmark equity index on changes in the broad dollar index by currency. The sample period is 2000-2016. Figure 7 visualize the relationship between the bank equity beta and the crosscurrency basis. On the horizontal axis, we plot the mean 5-year cross-currency basis by currency. On the vertical axis, we plot the mean ratio of individual bank equity's dollar beta over the respective equity index's dollar beta across banks headquartered in each currency area. We can see that the relative sensitivity of bank equities over equity index's sensitivity with respect to the dollar decreases in the level of cross-currency basis.
In countries with positive bases, such as Australia and Canada, bank equities are less sensitive to dollar fluctuation than their respective equity indices. In countries with very negative bases, such as Denmark, Switzerland and Japan, bank equities have significantly higher sensitivity to dollar fluctuation than their respective equity indices.
In summary, we find that a stronger dollar has a negative impact on bank equities, and the effect is particularly pronounced for banks headquartered in countries with a more negative cross-currency basis or a more severe dollar funding shortage.
Conclusion
In this paper, we document a triangular relationship formed by the strength of the US dollar, CIP deviations and cross-border bank lending denominated in dollars. A stronger dollar is associated with wider CIP deviations and lower growth of cross-border bank lending denominated in dollars. We interpret the magnitude of CIP deviations as the price of bank balance sheet capacity and dollar-denominated credit as a proxy of bank leverage, and argue that such a triangular relationship exists because of the impact of the dollar on the shadow price of bank leverage.
In particular, a strengthening of US dollar has adverse impacts on bank balance sheets, which, in turn, reduces banks' risk bearing capacity. As a result, wider CIP deviations and lower dollar-denominated cross-border bank lending both reflect a higher price of bank leverage as a result of a stronger dollar. Furthermore, we also find evidence that the euro has started to exhibit characteristics of a global funding currency in the period after the Great Financial Crisis.
